Two Associations with the Unencumbered Self Essay -- Philosophy Philos

Two Associations with the Unencumbered Self The unencumbered self separates who I am from my attributes and desires. Rawls encounters the unencumbered self in proposing both the veil of ignorance and the difference principle; both separate the subject from the attributes and ends of the subject. Rawls denies both the utilitarian and libertarian views as practical solutions, and puts forward the veil of ignorance and difference principle as a third alternative. This paper will begin with briefly describing what Sandel considers the unencumbered self. I will outline utilitarianism and liberalism as theories Rawls rejects, as well as Rawls’ philosophy as a practical Kantianism. I will identify the unnecessary transition Rawls makes from the veil of ignorance, which has much merit, to the difference principle, which Sandel adequately dissolves. I will address Sandel’s critique and his fourth alternative, the moderately-encumbered self, and give my impression of a Rawlsian reaction to Sandel’s fourth alte rnative. In conclusion I hope to show that Rawls encounters the unencumbered self at the veil of ignorance as well as the difference principle, the former being both applicable and a contribution to political philosophy, and the latter being cogently refuted by Sandel. Sandel describes the unencumbered self as valuing the ability to choose one’s own ends, rather than valuing specific ends in themselves. The unencumbered self draws a line of distinction between me and my attributes and desires, and presupposes that no project or commitment could weigh so heavily for me that I would not know who I am without it. Who I am is permanently unchanging, but the ends I desire or the attributes which I possess may be constantl... ... a more moderate view, the moderately-encumbered self, it is one Rawls would not accept because of its deviation from Kantian sacrifice and duty. In presenting the veil of ignorance, Rawls gives us a means to arrive at categorically worthwhile and acceptable political theories by channeling our inherent selfishness into political philosophy. In presenting the difference principle, Rawls denies an individual’s right to prosper from his own assets because he claims our assets are all arbitrarily distributed, but he does not justify sharing with society one’s prosperity because that would also be equally arbitrary. Sandel presents an alternative that Rawls would reject because it is not in accord with Kantian duty and sacrifice. Works Cited Goodin, Robert and Philip Pettit. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997.